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Abstract 
In the United States, the "best interests of child" is the standard by which legal and 
physical custody of a child is awarded. Such a standard places paramount emphasis on the 
holistic well-being of the child in question. Indiana Code § 31-14-13-2 lays out eight factors a 
judge must consider in their decision. One of the criteria considered by the Indiana judiciary is 
the sex of the child, making Indiana one of only two states to consider said criterion. While most 
states simply do not have it listed statutorily, some states, (e.g., Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Nebraska, Texas, and Vermont) specifically prohibit sex from being a factor weighed. Still 
others (e.g., Alabama, Iowa, and New York) have ruled such considerations unconstitutional. 
This paper seeks to determine whether the sex of a child should be a factor deliberated by 
synthesizing empirical research on gender/sex difference with legal research on context 
surrounding the "best interests of the child" standard. 
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Process Analysis Statement 
As a child of divorce, I have borne witness to the profound manner in which it impacts 
those involved-namely the children-both in the short- and long-term. As someone whose life 
was dictated by the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines and continual litigation, I felt somewhat 
of a pawn in the judicial game. While the law facially requires that judges rule in the child's best 
interest during custody dispute, growing up made me realize that the guidelines and statutes 
provided to the Indiana judiciary do not reflect what is actually in a child's best interests. This 
aspect of my lived experience has embedded a strong conviction within me that laws must be 
modified so that the best interests of the child don't only existin law, but also in life. 
During my time as a women's and gender studies major, I have come to realize the 
immense dissonance between the reality and perception of gender and sex differences. As such, 
when I was reading through Indiana Code searching for inspiration- ironic, I know- for my 
thesis, I was struck by the fact that judges in Indiana are required to consider the sex of the child 
when determining what custody arrangement is in their best interests. After attempting to 
determine if such a statutory factor was common in other states, I quickly realized that there was 
no easy way to do so. Family law is the jurisdiction of each state, so there are variances from 
state-to-state and no one resource to compare all with ease. (If only I had known that a surprising 
lack of information would be a prevalent theme throughout the entirety of this process.) 
In order to sufficiently discern if this criterion was meritorious, my thesis was 
interdisciplinary m nature-combining social sciences, public policy, and the law. This 
combination was the appropriate culmination of my two majors, political science and women's 
and gender studies. Naively, I believed that I was sufficiently capable at the onset of this thesis to 
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complete all research and analysis necessary. Realizing how different legal research was from 
any research I had completed in the past was a rude awakening. I had to learn how to navigate 
legal databases (i.e. Westlaw) and expand my vocabulary to include more legal vernacular-
don't get me started on the headache of learning how to properly cite cases! 
I commenced my research with the legal aspects of my intended study. I have visited the 
family law statutes of each of the 50 states. I searched Westlaw far and wide for cases, secondary 
sources (I know what those are now!), and statutes. I emailed judges, attorneys, state 
representatives for guidance. To complete the research relating to child development, I spent way 
too much time on JSTOR and in parenting sections at various libraries and bookstores. 
Undoubtedly, this process taught me more about myself taught me more than any other 
class I have taken during my undergraduate career. For the first time ever, starting the night 
before (or day of) was not merely a suggestion. Through my research, the value of patience was 
deeply ingrained. I am thankful I did not keep a running tab of the time I spent fruitlessly 
searching the bowels of Westlaw for something, anything. Moreover, I was genuinely astounded 
by how little research existed in several of my queries. Never in my wildest dreams did I think I 
would have to scour the web for hours upon hours just to discern how certain laws have been 
applied. I came into this process a positivist and will leave ... someone else. 
I have always known that I desire to affect positive change in this world. In the future, I 
hope I will be able to synthesize my love for academia and activism. This thesis seemed like an 
exciting starting point in that journey. I am sure one day I will look back and see all of the things 
that could have been better, but for today I am thankful that this research allowed me the 
opportunity to start living my dream job today. 
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Part One: 
In the Best Interest of the Child 
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I. Best Interest of the Child 
The Best Interest of the Child Doctrine has become hegemonic within legal discourse-
especially as it applies to child custody cases. While the concept remains nebulous, the standard 
is a highly subjective, discretionary test which weighs an factors deemed relevant to the 
wellbeing of a child. The standard has realized its "greatest influence" in such situations 
(Carbone, 2014, p. S113). While it was only incorporated into United States family courts during 
the 1960s (Duncan, 2004, p. 1250), the standard's origin is centuries old (Carbone, 2014, p. 
Sll2). Finding its foundation in 18th century English common law, the doctrine's intended 
purpose was a 'justification for intervention" by the state, superseding the rights of the parent 
(Carbone, 2014, p. S112). The standard would cross the pond over a century later in 1899, but 
would not be applied to parental rights; rather, it would first be applied to juvenile justice policy 
(Silva, 2014, p. 415). In the meantime, child custody law in America would go through immense 
transformation. From an ideology predicated on the English common law precedent of "absolute 
paternal power" (Charlow, 1986, p. 267) to one favoring the rights of the mother, "the custody 
pendulum [would complete] its shift in the mid-to-latter part of the nineteenth century 
(Bajackson, 2013, p.314). 
And there the pendulum would remain for over a . century. Though courts had been 
utilizing the "best interest of the child" standard "for years both in legal rulings and dicta" , they 
did not formally commence steady reliance upon the standard as it applies to child custody cases 
until the early 1970s (Duncan, 2004, p. 1250). Not a spontaneous occurrence, this paradigmatic 
shift coincided significantly with the second-wave of the feminist movement. During this time, 
women's rights advocacy groups nationwide worked tirelessly not only to expose gender 
inequalities, but also to press the legislative and judicial branches at all levels to adopt gender 
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neutral legal rules (Bruch, 2012, p. 1 ). Progressing to a deeper realization of these inequalities, 
"most states began to adopt no-fault divorce laws and remove the gender based bias in custody 
decisions" (Duncan, 2004, p. 1250). This goal was achieved through a standard endeavoring to 
rule in the favor of the "best interest of the child." 
Setting the basis for such a sweeping transformation was the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act (UMDA) set forth in 1970. This legislation drafted by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws asserted that custody decisions should be reliant upon 
what is in the "best interest of the child" (UMDA, § 402). Further, it delineated relevant factors 
to be expressly considered to guide such determinations. The UMDA would go qn to be 
adopted- albeit with variability-by most states (Goldstein, 2016, p. 11). Prior to legislating the 
best interests standard, courts typically wielded the "Tender Years ' Doctrine" which assumed 
that regardless of extraneous circumstances the mother should have custody of the children, 
especially when they were of tender years (less than four years old). It would take over two 
decades for 35 states to "replace their 'tender years ' custody rule[s] [that of the] 'best-interest of 
the child' (Bruch, 2012, p. 5). 
While gender was never mentioned in the 67 page UMDA document, the work was 
riddled with allusions to its intent of ridding marriage and divorce laws nationwide of gender-
specific advantages and disadvantages. In the prefatory note of the final draft presented, it was 
made known that the draft was inspired by the 1965 report of the Special Committee on Uniform 
and Divorce Marriage Laws, an exploration recommending no-fault divorce and its benefits-
more specifically the gender benefits (UMDA). Furthermore, as variations were made state-by-
state, "the additions have remained facially gender-neutral" (Bajackson, 2013, p. 315). 
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One of the first legal opinions corroborating the standard's gender neutral intent can be 
found in State ex rei. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 285 (Fam. Ct. 1973). In his ruling, Judge 
Sybil Kooper "challenged nearly a century of judicial presumption in favor of mothers" (Mason, 
1994, p. 123). Kooper asserted that "sound application of the 'best interests of the child' 
standard" should not increase the burden leveled against the father "in providing suitability for 
custody'' compared to that expected of the mother: "The simple fact of being a mother does not, 
by itself, indicate a capacity or willingness to render a quality of care different from that which 
the father can provide." State ex ref. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 285, 290 (Fam. Ct. 1973). 
Kooper cited what would come to be considered landmark Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) which 
had been decided earlier that year: 
The message of Frontiero is clear: persons similarly situated, whether male or female, must 
be accorded evenhanded treatment by the law. Legislative classifications may legitimately 
take account of need or ability; they may not be premised on unalterable sex 
characteristics that bear no necessary relationship to the individual's need, ability or life 
situation. Watts, 350 N.Y.S. at 290. · 
As recently as 2006, the intent of being gender-neutral in nature has been explicitly upheld: 
"Over the years, the "best interest of the child" standard has developed in this country through 
state courts and legislatures towards a more gender-neutral and child-centered inquiry." Doherty 
v. Wizner, 150 P.3d 456, 460 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
Aside from serving as an attempt to mitigate gender-based bias in custody decisions, the 
standard also seeks to, as nominally indicated, provide a legal decision "the best interest of the 
child." But what is in the child's best interest and who gets to decide? It depends on the state in 
which the case is being heard, as family law cases fall under the jurisdiction of state, rather than 
federal courts, due to their nature. Statutorily defined in two parts by 22 states (Child Welfare 
Information Gateway, 2016, p. 2) the Best Interest of the Child Standard (BICS) is first defmed 
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"in general terms and requires that custody decisions be made in the child's best interest is to 
advance and protect the child's physical, mental, social, and moral well-being" (McLaughlin, 
2011, p. 129-130). This premier setting forth of a purpose is where the other states end defining 
the standard statutorily, relying fully on the judge's discretion to determine what should be 
considered when determining a child's best interest. Alternatively, those who define the standard 
in two parts, continue on by laying out statutory criteria with the aim of guiding judges m 
making that determination. 
Whether defined in one or two parts, state statutes often provide some degree of guidance 
beyond determining what is in the child's best interest. Judges are often armed with, at 
minimum, "overarching goals, purposes, and objectives that shape the analysis in making best 
interests determinations" (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2016, p. 2). According to the 
Child Welfare Information Gateway (2016, p. 2), the following are predominant guiding 
principles laid out in state statutes across the country: 
1. The importance of family integrity and preference for avoiding removal of the 
child from his/her home (approximately 28 States, American Samoa, Guam, 
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) 
2. The health, safety, and/or protection of the child (21 States and the Northern 
Mariana Islands) 
3. The importance of timely permanency decisions (19 States and the Virgin Islands) 
4. The assurance that a child removed from his/her home will be given care, 
treatment, and guidance that will assist the child in developing into a self-
sufficient adult (12 States, American Samoa, and Guam) 
As previously mentioned, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce, when published in 1970, 
demanded the court "consider all relevant factors" (p.53). Delineating specific statutory criteria 
that should always be taken into consideration, they laid out five factors (UMDA, 1970, p. 53): 
(1) the wishes of the ~hild's parent or parents as to his custody; 
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; 
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his 
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest; 
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and 
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 
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Further, the legislation held that the "conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his 
relationship to the child" should not be considered by the court (UMDA, 1970, p. 54). 
Many states that consider statutory criteria today adopted those criteria set forth in the 
UMDA, often with slight alterations. Some of these adjustments were made before they adopted 
the factors for the first time, and still other states have updated their criteria with the 
advancement of social sciences, health sciences, and new legal precedents. According to the data 
most recently collected by the Children's Bureau, the following are factors are most commonly 
found in state statutes (2016, p. 2): 
1. The emotional ties and relationships between the child and his or her parents, siblings, 
family and household members, or other caregivers (15 States and the District of 
Columbia) 
2. The capacity of the parents to provide a safe home and adequate food, clothing, and 
medical care (10 States) 
3. The mental and physical health needs of the child (nine States and the District of 
Columbia) 
4. The mental and physical health of the parents (nine States and the District of Columbia) 
5. The presence of domestic violence in the home (nine States) 
Regardless of the extent to which each state guides their family courts' application of the 
standard, across the board it is widely accepted- and has been since the court's formulation of 
the standard in the 1960s and 70s-that "both the child's physical and psychosocial well-being is 
paramount"(Silva, 2014, p. 423). 
The endeavor of deciding in the child's best interest is undoubtedly a noble pursuit. So 
much so that it seems almost wrong to take issue with such a standard; however, good intentions 
do not a good standard make. In fact, a preponderance of legal scholars agree that the BICS "has 
at least as many weaknesses as it does strengths" (Bajackson, 2013, p. 311 ). Perhaps most aptly 
describing the perplexing nature of the standard, Regent University School of Law Professor 
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Lynne Marie Kohm asserted the doctrine "is at once the most heralded, derided and relied upon 
standard in family law today. It is heralded because it espouses the best and highest standard; it is 
derided because it is necessarily subjective; and it is relied upon because there is nothing better" 
(2008, p.1 ). 
In theory, the individualization allowed by the standard spares a child's fate from being 
compromised by a one-size-fits-all model. As each child has their own unique lived experience, 
personality, and external circumstances, it seems only logical that each decision must be made 
independently, accounting for each distinct case. However, the reality of the situation is not that 
straightforward. Case by case, a judge is tasked with the responsibility of "decid[ing] what is 
'best' for any child at any time under any particular circumstance" (Kohm, 2008, p. 1). Not only 
is this an immense amount of power to allow someone who is an expert in the field, such a 
reliance on someone whose expertise most likely lies within a different-albeit related-field is 
even more of a gamble. 
The standard, despite its best efforts, fosters incommensurability and subjectivity (Emery 
& Scott, 2014, p. 74). Even in states where statutory criteria are defined, the judge retains 
significant discretion: "The general assumption (consistent with the choice of a standard rather 
than a rule) is that different proxies for best interests will vary in importance depending on the 
circumstances of the case, and as a consequence statutes. do not guide courts by rank ordering 
factors" (Emery & Scott, 2014, p. 75). Thus, the courts are able to decide which factors should 
be weighed more heavily than others. In any given case, the judge can determine which criteria 
most heavily contribute to the child's best interest. Which is more important: the wishes of the 
parent(s) or the wishes of the child? Is a child's tie to their home, school, and community as 
important to their well-being as the interrelationship of the child with their parents? Which is in 
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the child's best interest: living with a parent who is mentally healthy or a parent who is 
physically healthy? All of these questions point to the burden of subjectivity placed squarely 
upon a judge's .shoulders on a case-by-case basis. 
When incommensurability and subjectivity are coupled with the wide breadth of 
discretion afforded the judge, decisions are pron~ to bias, compromising what could be in the 
child's best interest. Within his opinion on David M. v. Margaret M, 385 S.E.2d 912, 919 (W. 
Va. 1989), Justice Richard Neely addressed the standard' s inherent susceptibility to bias: 
No issue is more subject to personal bias than a decision about which parent is 'better.' 
Should children be placed with an 'open, empathetic' father or with a 'stem but value-
supporting' mother? The decision may hinge on the judge's memory of his or her own 
parents or on his or her distrust of an expert whose eyes are averted once too often. It is 
unlikely that the decision will be the kind of individualized justice that the system 
purports to deliver. (p. 919) 
The very nature of the standard "necessarily invites" courts to incorporate their own values, 
morals, and biases in order to determine what is best (Guggenheim, 2005, p. 40). In a field 
guided by precedent, judges are left with little guidance when precedent offers so little when 
applied to individual children. Moreover, the law and expert opinions bear little effect on the 
judge's decision (Atkinson, 1983, p. 16). Rather, "the decision in a custody case often will boil 
down to what is in the heart of the trial judge who hears the case" (Atkinson, 1983, p. 16). 
Post 1960s, as states across the country adopted the BICS, "unbridled judicial discretion 
became the pattern for best interests decision-making" (Kohm, 2008, p. 3). In fact, "[this 
precedent] became so firmly [ e ]mbedded that many judges often gave no more than lip service to 
precedent or even to legislation in their own state" (Kohm, 2008, p.3). Adapting to the extended 
breadth of discretion sustained by the court, custody Iitigators "know that the judge is the most 
important witness in any case" (Kohm, 2008, p. 38). Just as they would with any witness, 
11 
litigators seek to understand the biases each judge brings to the decision-making table (Kohm, 
2008, p. 38). 
These weaknesses have left the standard intended to combat gender-specific decisions 
wide open to gender bias in particular (Jacobs, 1997, 848). To illustrate what an article published 
in the Georgia State University Law Review referred to as the 'hidden gender bias" of the BICS, 
a case out of Michigan in 1994 involving one Jennifer Ireland was cited. Ireland, becoming a 
mother at the age of 19, never married and raised daughter, Maranda, on her own (Jacobs, 1997, 
846). Accepted into University of Michigan on scholarship, Ireland relied on a licensed day care 
facility for Maranda while attending classes (Jacobs, 1997, 846). Upon the father, Smith, failing 
to pay weekly child support, Ireland sued; "Smith countered by suing for custody of Maranda" 
(Jacobs, 1997, 846). Justice Raymond R. Cashen would find in favor of Smith, who had never 
spent time with Maranda prior to this, holding that "but for the daycare issue [Ireland and Smith] 
were equally good parents" (Jacobs, 1997, 846). Cashen emphasized that this factor was 
"pivotal" to his decision, asserting that "there is no way that a single parent [like Ireland] ... can do 
justice to their studies and the raising of a child." Instead, he found it would be best for Maranda 
to be placed in the custody of her father, where she would be taken care ofby Smith's mother, in 
lieu of being raised in the way she had been for the entirety of her life (Jacobs, 1997, 847). 
Ireland would regain custody of her daughter a year later (Mother Wins Day-Care Custody 
Battle, 1995), but not before her daughter would endure undue emotional trauma from being 
removed from her mother (Jacobs, 1997, 847)-not to mention the hefty legal fees Ireland likely 
accrued. 
While this case may appear an anomaly, it was only one case utilized to illustrate what 
has been described as a '"nationwide backlash of (gender) discrimination in child custody 
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awards' under the guise of the best interest of the child standard" (Jacobs, 1997, 848). Though 
these judges most likely are not ruling with malice, or even cognition of their inherent biases, the 
decisions are no less impactful. Moreover, decisions predicated on "inherent biases", like any 
others, are often "extremely difficult to change on appeal" (Kohm, 2008, p. 38). While Ireland 
might have been able to remedy her case, others are not nearly as lucky and many do not have 
the resources to even try. 
Though the BICS strives to be gender-neutral in nature, even those most novice to 
custody litigation recognize "that a so-called presumption-free and gender-neutral legal climate 
is at best wishful thinking" (Kohm, 2008, p. 38). While if the adoption of the standard marked 
"first time in U.S. history that child custody laws have been free of gender based factors (Artis, 
2004, 774)," it did not mark the last. Two states, Maryland and Indiana, list gender and sex of the 
child respectively as factors to be considered when determining what is in a child's best interest. 
If the standard is susceptible to gender bias when a judge is not explicitly told to consider it in a 
decision, how does it being explicitly listed as a factor to weigh affect that susceptibility? If the 
standard relies upon the premise that gender does not matter when determining a child's best 
interest, is listing it as a statutory criterion contrary to the standard's intent? The next section of 
this paper will examine Indiana and the use of sex as a factor to answer these questions. 
II. Sex as a Factor 
Each state retains the discretion to choose if and how they want to incorporate the BICS 
into their family courts. As previously discussed, all 50 have decided to do so, but all have done 
it in differing, albeit "strikingly similar", ways (McLaughlin, 2011 , p. 129). Their similarities 
most likely stem from the fact that many adopted a statute based off of the Uniform Marriage 
arid Divorce Act of 1970. Whether differing overarching principles, goals, or explicit factors are 
13 
considered, each state has made the statute uniquely their own. Each state's statute reflects the 
context in which it was adopted and, if applicable, revised. Namely, what was the culture of the 
state? When was the statute adopted? Which states had most recently adopted or modified 
statutes of their own? How had those states fared? What was social science of the day posing to 
the discussion? 
While the statute has been adapted since its original adoption in the 1970s, it has retained 
all of its original factors-though additional modifications have been instituted. Below is 
Indiana Code § 31-14-13-2 which delineates some of those factors deemed "relevant" when 
determining what is best for a child (phrases in bold indicate overlap with the UMDA): 
( 1) The age and sex of the child. 
(2) The wishes of the child's parents. 
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the 
child is at least fourteen (14) years of age. 
( 4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with: 
(A) the child's parents; 
(B) the child's siblings; and 
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest. 
(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community. 
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent. 
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence 
is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this 
chapter. 
Subsection Seven (7) and Eight (8) were both added to the statute in the 90s (1996 and 1999 
respectively), meaning that barring criterion one, all other factors outlined in the original statute 
were drawn directly from the factors posed in the UMDA. Furthermore, criteria 2-6 constitute 
the entirety of the factors listed in the UMDA. Why was it so important to Indiana that they add 
"age and sex of the child" as an additional criteria when they adopted the rest of the uniform 
code as is? 
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Unfortunately, there is very little legislative history on the statute and no public access to 
the discussion regarding why Indiana lawmakers settled upon the original factors in the first 
place. Because of the immense overlap with the UMDA, one can reasonably conclude that they 
took the UMDA into consideration. That conclusion cannot, however, explain why age and sex 
were tacked on at the top of the list. In an article for Family Law Quarterly (1983), Jeff 
Atkinson, professor at DePaul University College of Law in Chicago and past chair of the ABA 
Child Custody Committee, dug into various criteria considered across the United States when 
determining child custody within the scope of the BICS. Citing more than five cases, Atkinson 
asserted that "a consideration of age and sex of the children when making custody decisions" is 
"a backdoor to the Tender Years Doctrine" (1983, p. 13). While these courts operate under the 
guise of giving equal credence to mothers and fathers, they will find in favor of the mother solely 
because of the age and sex criteria. This phenomenon aligns well with the Tender Years 
Doctrine, predicated on the presumption that women's natures are more nurturing than males ', 
which originally assigned custody automatically to mothers when the child was of "tender years" 
(typically four or younger). However, as time went on, courts expanded this doctrine holding that 
mothers might be better suited to parenting overall, not simply better suited at raising young 
children. 
Conducting legal research in order. to determine if Atkinson's observation holds true for 
the application of §31-14-13-2 (a) in Indiana proved difficult for a number of reasons. First, the 
wealth of information provided by legal databases predominantly covers appellate court 
decisions, not trial court decisions. Thus, an appeal must be made regarding how a judge applied 
the statute. Even when this is the case, a judge is not likely to explicitly state when making a 
custody determination which criterion, if any, tipped the scale in favor of one parent. As DePaul 
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professor Dr. Julie Artis reminded, "Although appellate court judges write long documents that 
reveal their legal reasoning, very often, rulings written by trial court judges do not disclose the 
process by which they arrived at a particular decision" (2004, p. 772). Rather, they are more 
likely to frame their decision as a holistic review of the criteria, making it impossible to know 
how or if a judge is applying the age and sex criteria in a manner reminiscent of the Tender 
Years Doctrine. 
In Indiana, only one case specifically cites the use of the child's sex when making 
custody decisions: Matter of Adoption of Thomas, 431 N .E.2d 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). Justice 
William G. Conover, in his opinion, addressed the § 31-14-13-2 (a) by citing two applicable 
cases. First, he cited to Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), reiterating that "the Supreme 
Court has held the presumption that a natural mother is better suited to have the custody of 
young children violates the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment." I d. at 513. Further, 
he evoked Frontiero v. Richardson, (1973) 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 
asserting that "[ d]ifferential treatment based on sex is 'suspect."' I d. 
While Indiana still considers sex of the child, only one other state, Maryland, considers 
the gender of the child. (Disclaimer: Gender and sex undoubtedly have different meanings 
contemporarily (See Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 
3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015)); however, sex denotation then was virtually synonymous to the current 
use of gender when written in §31-14-13-2 (a) during the 1970s. Indeed, the current Indiana 
Code still offers no distinction between the two-even using them interchangeably (i.e. Ind. 
Code § 31-11-1-1.) Meanwhile, many states have declared considering the sex of a child during 
·custody proceedings unconstitutional-whether within the framework of their state constitution 
or the United States Constitution. 
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According to Atkinson, considering the sex of the child raises constitutional concerns in 
two respects (1983, p. 13-14): 
"First, because it involves the fundamental right to raise one's children and, second, 
because it presents the issue of whether it is permissible to treat people differently 
regarding a fundamental right because of sex. In addition to the parent's constitutional 
rights, it can be argued that children have a due process right to have their custody 
determinations based on the facts of their case rather than presumptions based on sex." 
In fact, in 1994, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, what they deemed should be "axiomatic": 
"Intentional discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to ratify and 
perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of 
men and women." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex ref. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 
1422, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994) 
However, important to note: Stanley v. Illinois did not make it unconstitutional for U.S. courts to 
exercise maternal preference in "child custody cases arising out of divorce, but principles 
declared by the Court in related areas strongly suggest that making presumptions based on sex 
violates the Constitution" (Atkinson, 1983, p. 13 ). 
While it still may remain constitutional on the federal level, various states, including the 
aforementioned Alabama, have found it to be unconstitutional in relation to their respective state 
constitutions. In State ex ref. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973), the 
court found no "compelling state interest" for discriminating on the basis of sex as applied to 
child custody cases: 
"The 'best interests' of the child might well qualify as such a compelling state interest if, 
in fact, it were served by the ' tender years presumption'. But since, as has been shown, 
the presumption does not in fact serve the child's interests, it does not constitute a 
compelling state interest justifying the different treatment of parents on the basis of sex. 
Thus the 'tender years presumption' in addition to its other faults, works an 
unconstitutional discrimination against the respondent." 
Still other states, have prohibited sex discrimination statutorily (i.e. Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Nebraska, Texas, Vermont), typically with the following verbiage: ""The court in 
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determining custody shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex" 
(Vasterling, 1989, p. 925). 
True, parent's sex and child's sex are distinct considerations nominally to be sure. 
However, how different are they truly if when one is typically considered in tandem with the 
other? What if the consideration of one is typically weighed against its relationship to the 
other? Considering either can be a "backdoor" to the Tender Years presumption, in such a case. 
For example, before the state of Texas prohibited the consideration of the child's sex and only 
prohibited the consideration of the parents', courts would assign custody under the pretense of 
the child's best interest, while simultaneously prescribing to the Tender Years presumption. See 
Gay v. Gay, 737 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. App. 1987). 
While it is permissible to "consider the needs of a child of a certain age or gender, 
consideration of those needs does not provide an automatic answer to the question of which 
parent can better meet those needs" (Atkinson, 1983, p. 13) In practice, however, there are many 
cases which corroborate the tendency for a child's and parent's sex to be considered 
concurrently-as if parent's sex automatically better qualifies them to fulfill a child's needs. In 
Maryland, the other state that mandates the consideration of the gender/sex of the child, one such 
case is on record. In 1998, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed a trial court's decision to 
place a three year old girl with her mother, "solely because she had a female hand and that 
female child of a certain age had particular and specific need to be with her same sex 
parent." Giffin v. Crane, 716 A.2d 1029, 1036 (Md. Ct. App. 1998) In the opinion of Giffin v. 
Crane, Chief Justice Bell held, similar to Justice William G. Conover in Adoption of Thomas, 
sex discrimination in child custody cases is "suspect" and in opposition to Maryland's Equal 
Rights amendment. 716 A.2d at 103 7. 
18 
Another example of the implicit (and sometimes explicit) biases judges bring to the 
bench, comes from Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 689 (N.D. 1994). In the opinion, the 
appellate court asserts that the trial court's decision was made with "improper gender bias," 
citing the trial court's questioning of the mother of the father (Roland): 
"THE COURT: In the event Rollie were the primary custodian, and in the event there 
[were} certain things in [the child's} training that might best be done by a woman, would 
it be your anticipation that you would be the teacher? 
"THE WITNESS: No, Rollie ·is the teacher. And !just help him[.] 
"THE COURT: Getting back to my question, in the event there are certain things that a 
girl should learn that [are} easiest to learn from a woman, would you be anticipating that 
you would be that woman? 
"THE WITNESS: Yes." 
Though the judge made his decision "in the best interest of the child," he was able to evoke the 
Tender Years presumption by means of considering the relationship between the sex of the child 
and sex of the parent. This phenomenon was not exclusive to this case, this decade (1990s ), nor 
the state of North Dakota. 
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Iowa heard a similar case-illustrating that the tendency 
to use the sex of the child or of the parent to evoke gender-biased rulings based on the tender 
years presumption is not isolated. The court critiqued the trial court's holding that Jim, the father, 
"will be able to engage in various activities with the boys, such as athletic events, fishing, 
hunting, mechanical training and other activities that boys are interested in" despite there being 
no evidence presented to the court to support that statement. In re Marriage of Tresnak, 297 
N.W.2d 109, 112 (Iowa 1980). The trial court, instead, presumably relied upon its preconceived 
gender stereotypes and gender roles. Contradicting this, the appellate court ruled that "neither 
parent has an edge on the other based merely on sex." ld. Further concluding that "[i]t logically 
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follows that neither parent has an edge on the other based on the sex of the children either. We 
reject the idea that any a priori notion of parental fitness should be based on the sex of parent or 
child. Id. at 112-13. 
Not only can this tendency be evidenced in various states across time, it can also be 
attributed directly to the state of Indiana itself because of research conducted during the late 
1990s the by aforementioned DePaul professor Dr. Julie Artis. In the process of interviewing 25 
Indiana judges, Artis found that the judges "nearly unanimously agreed that the statute is not 
restrictive at all" (2004, p. 790). Reinforced by multiple judges saying that "they would not 
share these opinions in public", Artis believed she fostered an environment that encouraged the 
judges to speak candidly, because she provided them confidentiality and conducted in-depth, 
face-to-face interviews, (2004, p. 780). In regards to the judges feelings about the Tender Years 
doctrine, 
"[T]en judges expressed some level of support for the automatic award of infants to 
mothers. However, when asked to consider the hypothetical case involving an infant, four 
additional judges-judges who earlier responded that they do not use the tender years 
doctrine-invoked the tender years doctrine. Thus, more than half of the judges supported 
the idea of the tender years doctrine" (Artis, 2004, p.783). 
Further, male judges were much more likely (72% to 17%) than female judges to utilize the 
tender years presumption when issuing a child custody ruling-a difference found to be 
"statistically significant even though the sample is small" (Artis, 2004, p. 791-92). This 
occurrence is likely tied to the fact that women are more likely to subscribe to egalitarian 
parenting views, whereas men are more likely to subscribe to more traditional views (Artis, 
2004, p. 791). While the culture of the courts have likely changed since the late 90s, it is 
interesting to note that the percentage of women has changed by less than ten percent (14% to 
23%) in nearly two decades (Statistical Review of Current Indiana Trial Court Judges, 20 16). 
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In sum, the consideration of child's sex when determining child custody, to quote Matter 
of Adoption of Thomas is "suspect." 431 N.E.2d at 513. It likely allows Indiana judges a 
"backdoor" to the Tender Years doctrine (Atkinson, 1983, p. 13), which is a standard proven not 
to be in the child's best interest. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 291. Not only does § 31-14-13-2 (a) 
contradict the gender-neutral intent of BICS, it also has been found unconstitutional or is 
forbidden statutorily in many other states. This alone is enough to question its merit in the 
Indiana Code, but is there merit to distinguishing the sex of the child from a child development 
standpoint? Are boys and girls truly so different that they have different enough needs to justify 
such a standard? If so, can such needs only be fulfilled by certain parents? The next part of this 
paper will attempt to address these queries. 
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Part Two: 
In the Best Interest of Child Development 
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Judges, though experts in the law, are rarely also experts in child development. As such, 
the state of Indiana, along with many other states, provided more specificity to its judiciary 
regarding the best interest of the child statute. The factors provide an outline, not a 
comprehensive guidebook to the courts. Indiana Code dictates not all factors that the judge will 
consider, but rather serves as a reminder to those that the judge should and must consider. Those 
factors enumerated in § 31-14-13-2 are chosen, presumably, because they are accepted as . 
considerations crucial to ensuring the well-being of the child. As previously established, the state 
provides no weighted value to each criterion; therefore, judges are allowed the discretion to 
consider all factors with equal weight or even assign value to each component as they see fit. 
When evaluating the statute, each criterion must be considered: why is it weighed and to 
what end? When appraising the merit of contemplating a child's "sex" as dictated by § 31-14-13-
2 (a), however, more specific questions are raised. How is "sex" being defmed operationally? 
Are boys and girls truly so different that taking their sex into consideration is paramount to 
appropriately deciding what is in their best interest? Are the aspects critical to their well-being 
different enough to justify its consideration? Are individuals of a particular sex similar enough to 
one another to consider their needs as generalizable? 
As has been established, in practice, the sex of the child is rarely weighed in isolation. 
Often it is considered in concert with the sex of the parent(s). Can the, perhaps, distinct needs of 
boys and girls only be fulfilled by an individual of a specific sex? Does sex composition of a 
child-parent relationship matter? For example, are daughters better suited to custody with their 
mothers based of off the needs hinged upon their sex and what a mother can provide based off of 
hers? 
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Finally, how are judges compelled to rule when presented with such a criterion? Are they 
capable of objectivity, or do implicit biases hinder their ability to decide with impartiality? As 
presented in the previous section, many judges have applied this factor by placing children with 
the parent of the same sex. Are these decisions based upon the evidence presented on a case-by-
case basis or because of preconceived beliefs held by the court? 
I. Are boys and girls that different? 
According to countless public opinion polls and studies, Americans certainly think they 
are. Before a child is even born, gender stereotypes are already pushed onto them. From the 
moment one is told whether the fetus is a boy or a girl, schemas are activated. A schema is a 
"knowledge-unit that tells [individuals] how to react to a particular stimulus" (Nelson, 2015, p. 
215). Parents rate female fetuses as "softer, littler, calmer, weaker, more delicate, and more 
beautiful than male fetuses" (Sweeney & Bradbard, 1988, p. 397). Research examining parental 
perceptions directly following childbirth revealed that "parents of boys and girls had already 
begun to view their infants differently"-perceiving "daughters as softer, finer featured, more 
awkward, more inattentive, weaker, and more delicate" and sons as "firmer, larger featured, 
better coordinated, more alert, stronger, and hardier" (Rubin, Provenzano, & Luria, 1974, p. 513 
& 517). Despite significant difference in perception, objective measures (i.e. weight, length, and 
Apgar scores) 
ofthe babies indicated no statistically significant difference (Rubin, Provenzano, & Luria, 1974, 
p. 515). 
On average, gender stereotypes are applied to any given person from the womb to the 
grave. Moreover, despite contemporary advances in how yarious sciences have come to 
understand both sex and gender on a spectrum, Americans still perceive the world in rather 
24 
straightforward dichotomies. In 2017, the Pew Research Center conducted public opinion polls 
regarding perceptions of gender differences. Their results showed that a predominance of 
Americans feel that "men and women are basically different" (Parker, Horowitz, & Stepler, 
2017). More specifically, they found that Americans feel that men and women "express their 
feelings" different, manifest different physical abilities, take personal interest in distinct 
domains, and, most applicable to the study at hand, have inherently different approaches to 
parenting (Parker et al., 201 7). Important to note: the study was unable to find consensus on the 
origins of these differences. Interestingly, the difference in opinion was divided largely by 
gender; men were more likely to attribute these distinctions to biology, whereas women were 
more likely to attribute these discrepancies to societal expectations (Parker et al., 20 17). 
Though this study wasn't aimed specifically at perceptions of distinctions between males 
and females during childhood, it logically follows that the perceptions are generalizable as no 
limited age group was specified in the questions posed. These views are unsurprising, especially 
when historical and contemporary context are considered. Just like our predecessors, a high 
premium has been placed on maintaining distinctions between males and females. Currently, 
these divides can be seen clearly pervading many aspects of daily life. From different sports 
leagues to his and hers versions of nearly any commercial product, the lines are drawn. However, 
. these distinctions are not only deeply embedded in the "subjectivity" of culture, they also find a 
home in the "objectivity" of academia. Psychology as a discipline has been particularly 
enamored by gender differences since its formalization in during the late 19th century (Shields, 
1975, p. 741). 
According to a literature analysis conducted to determine trends in gender development 
research during a 35 year period (1975-2010), the most frequent topic area "across all years was 
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Gender Differences" (Zosuls, Miller, Ruble, Martin, & Fabes, 2011, p. 9) in Sex Roles, a 
"global, multidisciplinary, scholarly, social and behavioral science journal" ("Sex Roles", 20 18). 
In fact, more than half of the articles published in Sex Roles dealt directly with gender 
differences (Zosuls et al., 2011, p. 9). Moreover, this emphasis on differences between males and 
females was not singular to Sex Roles, but rather "mirrored research in the field more broadly" 
(Zosuls et al., 2011, p. 9). More recently from the 1990s through the 2000s, a downturn in this 
topic area has been observed (Zosuls et al., 2011 , p. 9)-perhaps indicating a slight decrease in 
interest of this topic or a shift from interest in whether or not differences are present to why they 
are. 
This paper will focus mainly on gender difference as "sex" is used operationally in 
Indiana to mean something beyond strictly biological difference. That said, Indiana courts seem 
to use the terms interchangeably, so the overemphasis of both could prove impactful to the 
court's decision. 
Historically, many studies have indicated that gender and sex differences exist across 
various domains; however, more recent reports indicate that these disparities have been 
overemphasized. Psychological theories regarding gender differences used to find most of their 
grounding in biology. That is, earlier research held that disparities between males and females 
were based on biological differences-what today might be referred to as "sex differences." 
. These arguments grounded in biology "have long been advanced to justify gender inequality" 
(Zosuls et al., 2011 , p. 4), which conveniently benefited those with the most power in society as 
well as a predominance of those conducting said research. 
Furthermore, across disciplines, a "bias against reporting negative or null results" 
pervades (European Commission, 2013, p. 48). According to an article published by the 
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University of Pennsylvania which synthesized previous research done regarding publication bias, 
studies are less likely to be published if the statistical significance found is greater than .05 
(Hubbard & Armstrong, 1997, p. 2). Essentially, as it applies to the research of gender 
difference, this means that researchers are hard pressed to get their work published if they find 
no divergence. Consequently, researchers feel pressure to construct research focusing on 
difference rather than similarity. 
This bias has led to a rise in researchers asserting gender differences, even in the absence 
of sufficient evidence or documentation. For example, a "review of peer-reviewed papers 
reporting 'sex-related differences in genetic associations' found that 'most claims were 
insufficiently documented or spurious"' ("Overemphasizing Sex Differences as a Problem", 
2013). Counterfeit reporting is just one small component of how negligent reporting affects the 
overemphasis of gender difference. More often, researchers inappropriately attribute difference 
to sex, overlooking other factors that could be confounding such as "gender roles or 
socioeconomic status" ("Overemphasizing Sex Differences as a Problem", 20 13). 
More recently, speculation surrounding the "usefulness" of placing such a high premium 
on statistical significance has been raised in psychology and various other disciplines (Hubbard 
& Armstrong, 1997, p. 2). Even the American Statistical Association (ASA), has issued a 
warning on the reliance of p-values which are often "misinterpreted and misused" (Wasserstein 
& Lazar, 2016, p. 129). "[T]esting hypotheses by statistical analysis" is an approach 
characterized by "numerous deep flaws" not limited to misunderstanding, misleading, and a lack 
of reproducibility (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016, p. 129). 
The acknowledgment of the overemphasis regarding both gender and sex differences is 
integral to understanding the evolution of results concerning those differences from the past until 
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now. Moreover, this overemphasis likely has tangible effects on a judge's conception of what is 
and what is not in the best interest of a certain child. The overstating of differences between the 
genders and sexes has led to increased stereotyping of men and women (European Commission, 
2013, p. 48). Studies which contribute to this trend "have sometimes lead to discriminatory 
practices" (European Commission, 2013, p. 49). Certain legal standards discriminated based off 
of gender stereotypes. For example, research in the past asserted that women are better 
caregivers and parents because they are inherently more nurturing (Chodorow, 1978, p. 11 ). 
Because of this, men were less likely to retain custody of their children, especially when they 
were young. This principle, known as the Tender Years Doctrine, was the legal predecessor to 
the Best Interest of the Child standard. Inflating gender and sex differences, though 
understandable given historical trends and prevailing research constructs, has broad negative 
consequences that extend outside of academia. 
Today, the gender similarities hypothesis, advanced by researcher Dr. Janet Shibley 
Hyde, has gained significant traction. Unlike many in the past who have asserted drastic gender 
difference, Hyde poses that males and females are actually more alike than they are different. 
She arrived to this conclusion after conducting a meta-analysis of 46 meta-analyses (2005, p. 
581 ). Meta-analysis is "a statistical method for aggregating research findings across many 
studies of the same question" (Hyde, 2005, p. 582). From the broad range of samples from each 
of the 46 meta-analyses reviewed, Hyde was able to conclude that from childhood through 
adulthood males and females are more alike than they are different on most, albeit not all 
psychological variables (2005, p. 581). Notable exceptions, or domains in which discrepancies 
are moderate or large in significance, include motor performance, "some-but not all- measures 
of sexuality", and aggression (Hyde, 2005, p. 586). Given the bias against publishing null 
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results, this meta-analysis is, if anything, an overestimation of gender differences as the sample 
probably did not contain any studies showing no-difference. 
These detected differences are not static. Rather gender differences change throughout 
one's lifetime as they are heavily dependent on age and context (Hyde, 2005, p. 581). Context 
has the ability to "creat[e], eras[e], or even revers[ e) psychological gender differences" (Hyde, 
2005, p. 588). For example, she discussed the phenomenon of deindividuation, which "refers to 
state in which an individual has lost his or her individual identity" (Hyde, 2005, p. 588). When 
such circumstances occur that allow an individual to be anonymous, they are able to go off their 
social script-meaning they are able to stop acting in the way they are expected to given their 
identity. One way to think of this is how one is expected to behave a certain way at work; 
however, those expectations go away once you shed that identity by going off the clock, 
changing out of your uniform, etc. In studies which have emulated this sort of environment, "no 
significant gender differences" were found (Hyde, 2005, p. 589). This phenomenon would 
indicate that gender difference are constructed contextually and are not inherently essential. 
Additionally, Hyde addresses how "interpretation of effect sizes is contested" (2005, p 
586). It matters not just that there is a difference. How big is the difference and what is the 
overall implication of that difference? Expanding upon Hyde's work, Dr. Diane Halpern, a 
professor at Claremont College and then-president of the American Psychological Association 
asserted that even when differences are found, they should not be taken at face-value as they 
could be used to justify "prejudicial beliefs and discriminatory actions" (American Psychological 
Association, 2005). Rather than focusing on the differential, she advocates that one wonder not 
just if the results are statistically significant, but also if they are meaningful (American 
Psychological Association, 2005). Applying this holding to the research at hand, statistically 
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significant differences found between boys and girls are not enough alone to be considered. One 
must understand the magnitude of difference and the implications those differences have. For 
example, if, as established in Hyde's research, boys are more aggressive than girls: how much 
more aggressive are they and would one parent be better equipped to handle this trait? 
Hyde's research is reinforced by several other studies (Costa Jr. , Terracciano, & McCrae, 
2001; Else-Quest, Hyde, Goldsmith & Van Hulle, 2006; Zell, Krizan, & Teeter, 2015; Siegling, 
Furnham, & Petrides, 2015; Maccoby, 1990) that advance results aligned with her hypothesis-
two of which are also meta-analyses. The replicability of her results on such a large scale 
corroborate her hypothesis. Moreover, the additional studies provided greater breadth to her 
assertion that males and females are basically the same. 
For example, the meta.,.analysis carried out by Costa Jr. et al. contained a sample of both 
college-age and adult individuals from 26 cultures (N = 23,031) (200 1, p. 322). Results revealed 
that cross-culturally "gender differences are small relative to individual difference within 
genders" (2001 , p. 322). Another meta-analysis conducted by Else-Quest et al. tested 35 
dimensions of temperament in children ages 3 months to 13 years of age, finding that there were 
generally only small gender differences, if any, though there were a few notable exceptions-
namely, effortful control (higher in girls) and surgency (higher in boys) (2006, p. 60). Moreover, 
this study reinforced Hyde's assertion that gender differences varied as a function of age (Else-
Quest et al., 2006, p. 61). Their moderator analyses (or analyses that determine the extent a 
variable other than the independent variable is affecting the dependent variable) "indicated that 
gender differences ... were greater in school age children" likely due to the fact they had attained 
"more cumulative exposure to socialization" (Else-Quest et al. , 2006, p. 62). However, even 
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though these differences increased in older children, most of them were still considered small 
(Else-Quest et al., 2006, p. 60). 
All of the studies cited (parenthetically and explicitly) underscore the significant 
influence of context on measured gender difference. Differences "emerge primarily in social 
situations and their nature varies with the gender of dyads and groups" (Maccoby, 1990, p. 513). 
In fact, the differential between boys and girls is "minimal when children are observed or tested 
individually" (Maccoby, 1990, p. 513). Even when differences are measured, the vanance 
between males and females is less than the variance within one gender (Maccoby, 1990, p. 
513)-meaning that on average a girl is more likely to be more different than another girl than 
she is a boy. Both sex and gender appear too broad of ranges to be considered as good 
indications of a child's personality and disposition. As such, the research would indicate that 
considering a child's identity as a function of their categorical sex is unwise and unfounded 
based off empirical evidence. 
Furthermore, many studies suffer from racial biases as samples are generally 
predominantly white. According to the concept of intersectionality, "gender effects can never be 
understood in isolation and must always be examined in context" (Hyde, 2014, p. 21). While 
context as external factors has already been explored, the interplay with internal factors has yet 
to be established. Internal factors could include other identities an individual holds such as race, 
ethnicity, religion, or socio-economic status. While all of these can affect the manifestation of 
gender, this paper will focus on race as a case study to prove the extreme variability of gender as 
a category. 
When gender is measured in concert with race, the variation measured within one gender 
increases. A 1999 meta-analysis on gender differences in self-esteem revealed that, on average, 
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the gender difference was d = 0.21, signaling a slight difference favoring males (Hyde, 2014, p. 
17). However, when race was cross-analyzed, "the magnitude of the gender difference was d = 
0.20 among whites but -0.04 among blacks" (Hyde, 2014, p. 17). Meaning that even the small 
difference between white males and females was nonexistent between males and females who 
identified as Black. In a meta-analysis aggregating studies on gender differences in mathematical 
performance, gender difference only existed for individuals who identified as White (d = 0.13) 
(Hyde, 2014, p. 19). The male advantage did not translate to those who identified as Black (d =-
0.02), Hispanic (d = 0.00), or Asian American (d = -0.09) (Hyde, 2014, p. 19). A meta-analysis 
by Else-Quest et al. looking at gender difference in self-conscious emotions showed a similar 
result. The difference between males and females who identified as White was larger than the 
difference between non-White males and females. The overall finding of d = -0.29 was skewed 
significantly by the large difference between White individuals (d = -0.32) even though the 
difference for non-White individuals was only d = -0.06 (Hyde, 2014, p. 19). 
These results not only further corroborate the gender similarities hypothesis posed by 
Hyde, they also underscore the variability within one gender. Identities, such as gender, do not 
manifest in isolation. As evidenced above, race plays a significant role in gender differences 
measured. Furthermore, race is just one of many variables that has such an effect (Shields, 2008, 
p. 302). Because "the formation and maintenance of identity categories is a dynamic process," 
considering "sex" as a static factor into the consideration of a child's wellbeing is misguided and 
ill-advised. Unless Indiana courts are dictated to consider all factors that could affect one's 
gender identity, they will be unable to make responsible inferences based off this identifier. 
Moreover, even if the court's tried to do so by adding in factors such as race, compiling an 
exhaustive list of all factors relevant would be impossible. 
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II. Are boys' and girls' needs different? 
Parenting is often referred to as the hardest job in the world. Though it's accepted as such 
due to myriad factors, perhaps the primary reason is that there is no one guide on what the job 
entails, what needs to be accomplished, nor best practices along the way. This ambiguity leaves 
both parents and family courts considerable uncertainty. Due to the range of parenting styles 
avowed, this paper will review three commonly accepted approaches to parenting-all of which 
have been extensively researched. These three methods (attachment theory, stability theory, and 
good enough parent theory) will provide a case study of currently accepted notions of what 
children need from their parents. 
In the early 1940s, British psyohologist John Bowlby laid the foundations of attachment 
theory (Cassidy & Shaver, 1999, p. 3). Based upon "observations he made when he worked in a 
home for maladjusted boys," attachment theory's original position held that the mother-child 
relationship was critical to both the long-term and immediate well-being of the child (Cassidy & 
Shaver, 1999, p. 3). Based off of specific observations of two boys "both of whom had suffered 
major disruptions in their relationships with their mothers," Bowlby's work honed in on the 
mother-child relationship-seeking to understand why the mother alone was so important to the 
child (Cassidy & Shaver, 1999, p. 3). 
Originally, it was hypothesized that this relationship was special because the mother fed 
the child; however, later empirical research contradicted this holding (e.g. some infant geese 
would become attached to "parents--or even objects-that did not feed them") (Cassidy & 
Shaver, 1999, p. 3 ). In later iterations, he hypothesized that the distinct nature of this relationship 
was due to a basic instinct towards survival: "Genetic selection favored attachment because they 
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increased the likelihood of child-mother proximity and thereby child survival" (Cassidy & 
Shaver, 1999, p. 4). 
"One of the most popular and empirically grounded [parenting] theories" today, 
attachment theory holds that "attachment" is just one of many aspects relating to the tie between 
caregiver and child (Benoit, 2004, p. 541 ). This dimension of their relationship makes the child 
feel "safe, secure and protected" (Benoit, 2004, p. 541).The primary overarching principle of 
attachment theory "is the need of a child to develop a relationship with at least one primary 
caregiver for healthy emotional and social development to occur" (Benware, 2013, p. iii). 
Though a bulk of previous attachment theory research has paid disproportionate attention 
to the mother-child relationship, while curtailing that of the father-child, contemporary theory 
does not draw distinctions between mother-child and father-child relationships (Cassidy & 
Shaver, 1999, p. 64). The theory delineates four factors believed to be most impactful on the 
level of attachment in a given relationship- none of which are dependent on the gender nor sex 
of the parental figure (Cassidy & Shaver, 1999 , p. 15).: 
"(1) how much time the infant spends in the figure 's care; 
(2) quality of care each figure provides; 
(3) each figure's emotional investment in the child; 
( 4) social cues" 
Research indicates that infants are likely to form more than one attachment, which would 
indicate that the mother-child relationship is not singular in its characteristics (Cassidy & Shaver, 
1999, p. 14). In fact, children are "very likely to form an attachment with their father, even if the 
interaction with the father [is] rather infrequent" (Cassidy & Shaver, 1999, p. 14). More recent 
work has advocated a "family perspective of attachment" in hopes of ridding attachment theory 
of the gender politics which have plagued it throughout its evolution (e.g., Belsky 1996; Cowan, 
1997). 
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Similar to attachment theory in that it seeks to provide children with a sense of security, 
other researchers hold that stability is the most crucial element to child well-being. Many 
policies (e.g. America's Report Card Advisory Board, 2012; "Educational Stability for Children 
and Youth in Foster Care," 201&; Allen & Bissell, 2004) and research (e.g. Hartnett, Leathers, 
Falconnier, & Testa, 1999; Dregan & Gulliford, 2011 ; Howes, Hamilton, & Phillipsen, 1998) 
reinforce its importance. There are different types of stability: parental, marital, educational, 
placement, financial, etc. These and others all play a role in a healthy child development (Wood 
& Kennison, 20 15). 
Children develop best in "stable and nurturing environments where they have a routine 
and know what to expect" (Sandstrom & Huerta, 2013, p. 5). According to a study by Urban 
Institute, "instability'' is best understood as "the experience of abrupt, involuntary, and/or 
negative change in individual or family circumstances" (Sandstrom & Huerta, 2013, p. 10). 
When children are exposed to circumstances which undermine their sense of stability, they 
experience undue stress (Sandstrom & Huerta, 2013, p. 5). Parents are necessary to act as a 
"buffer against negative effects of instability'' (Sandstrom & Huerta, 2013, p. 5).When they fail 
to serve in this protective capacity, the "unbuffered stress" children are exposed to has 
significant negative impacts on their mental health and cognitive functioning (Sandstrom & 
Huerta, 2013, p. 5). Research draws no line between the stability provided by males and females. 
As such, stability can be given to children effectively regardless of parent gender. 
Some have even proposed that too much pressure has been put on the practice of how to 
parent best. Instead of exerting efforts to determine the premier parenting method, some assert 
that the best parent isn't the perfect parent, but rather is just 'good enough" (Gray, 2015). In its 
original iteration, this theory explored the "good enough mother"; however, it was expanded by 
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Bruno Bettelheim in his 1987 publication, A Good Enough Parent (Gray, 20 15). A "good 
enough parent" is "more concerned with the child's experience of childhood than with the child's 
future as an adult" (Gray, 2015). By focusing on the present, parents are capable of eliminating 
the stressors relating to the future. Instead, they focus on the immediacy of utilizing "conscious 
reflection, maturity, and empathy" while interacting with their children (Gray, 20 15). This 
approach recommends that parents give their children only what they want and need, but nothing 
more (Gray, 2015). 
Like the previous two parenting theories, the "good enough parent" approach does not 
specify the importance of parent gender nor sex. These case studies, mirroring seminal pieces of 
research more generally, do not (or, specifically, do not currently) indicate that there are any 
differences in a child's needs dependent upon sex or gender. These findings hold true when 
applied more specifically to children's needs post-divorce (Sigal, Sandler, Wolchik, & Braver, 
2011, p. 121). According to a meta-analysis of 63 studies, the same factors (feelings of closeness 
and authoritative parenting) were strongly correlated with positive benefits for children of 
divorce-regardless of gender and age (Amato & Gilbreth, 1999, p. 559). Authoritative 
parenting is caregiving characterized by high demands and high responsiveness. Another meta-
analysis covering 37 studies (N > 81 ,000) found that differences between male and female 
children were not significant in terms of psychological well-being (Amato & Keith, 1991, p. 55). 
The results indicated "most of the disadvantages associated with divorce are similar for boys and 
girls" (Amato, 2001, p. 365). 
As established in Pari One, promoting the child's well-being is the principal concern of 
"best interests of the child" determinations ("Detern:llning the Best Interest of the Child", 2016, 
p. 2). Through the advancements in researchers' understanding of child development, a 
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consensus has been reached that well-being is a multi-dimensional concept, including "physical, 
emotional, and social" aspects (Statham & Chase, 2010, p. 5). Limited knowledge is available 
regarding how well-being may or may not vary as a function of variables like gender and sex 
(Statham & Chase, 2010, p. 5); however, of the information presently available, the needs of 
boys and girls are generally similar ("How Does Divorce Affect Girls and Boys Differently?", 
2018). 
Instead of looking at the child's gender in hopes that it will reveal relevant details 
conducive to their well-being, a better indicator is the "quality of parenting provided [to] them" 
(Kelly & Emery, 2003, p. 356). Parenting characterized by "high support and high control" can 
serve as a "protective factor" for children (Bastaitis & Mortelmans, 2016, p. 2178). A protective 
factor or moderator is any element that mitigates stressors exacted on children during or after a 
divorce (Amato, 2000, p. 1271). Studies examining protective factors (i.e. Kelly & Emery, 2003; 
Amato, 2000; Bastaitis & Mortelmans, 2016) illustrate that the most critical protective factors 
are reliant upon the parent(s) involved, rather than the demographics of the child. For example, 
the psychological adjustment of each parent is one of the best predictors of child well-being post-
divorce (Bastaitis & Mortelmans, 2016, p. 2178). No evidence has been found to indicate that 
women and men experience statistically significant differences in psychological distress post-
divorce (Amato & Booth, 1991, p. 402). A meta-analysis of 33 studies found that children raised 
through joint custody rather than sole custody adjusted better post-divorce (Bauserman, 2002, p. 
91). 
In sum, considering the gender of the child as indicative of certain needs or 
characteristics when determining a child's best interest post-divorce is not grounded in empirical 
research. Boys and girls are affected by and adjust to divorce in similar ways (Lansford, 2009, p. 
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143}---in fact, some studies report no gender differences (e.g. Amato & Cheadle, 2005; Sun & 
Li, 2002). However, as established in Gay v. Gay, 737 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), 
considerations of child's sex/gender are often weighed in tandem with considerations of parents' 
sex. Clearly, boys and girls aren't that different, but are mothers and fathers? Is one gender better 
suited to caring for children? Is mothering different than fathering? 
III. Does parent gender matter? 
The majority of the American public opines that mothers and fathers parent in "basically 
different" ways (Parker et al., 2017). Even though gender roles have become less restrictive, 
most still believe that mothers are "better equipped than fathers to care for a child" (Livingston 
& Parker, 201 7). While the public is prone to overemphasizing gender differences, many studies 
have corroborated these presumed gender differences relating to parenting style (McKinney, 
Brown, & Malkin, 2017, p. 290). However, these traditional perceptions stem from research 
studying married mothers and fathers only (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010, p. 4). Most, though not all, 
research based off of married couples arrives at a common conclusion: "Most married wives 
exceed their husbands relatively and absolutely on time spent in child care and domestic work 
and on most types of interaction with their children" (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010, p. 4). It is hardly 
surprising that women "are more likely to commit to children, relationships, and homemaking"; 
however, it would be erroneous and simplistic to assume that these differences are directly 
correlated to simply sex or gender (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010, p. 5). Rather, these differences 
pervade given societal presumptions that women are better caregivers as well as numerous 
societal structures (e.g., maternity leave more available than paternity leave and changing rooms 
more likely situated in women's restrooms). Factors such as these could encourage or push males 
and females into certain roles when both are present. However, single parents are not necessarily 
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expected to fit into those roles. Because a predominance of these studies have been conducted on 
married, co-residing mothers and fathers, other factors such as sexual orientation and family 
structure could be contributing to the average differences. 
To test whether these differences are intrinsically tied to sex or gender, research on same-
sex couples and single parents have become more prevalent. After all (Dufur, Howell, Downey, 
Ainsworth, & Lapray, 2010, p. 1094): 
"If mothers and fathers parent in substantially different ways, children raised by gay or 
lesbian parents should experience some of the same predicted shortcomings children in 
single-mother and single-father families would; in each of these cases, children lack the 
influence of a parent of a particular sex." 
A 2007 meta-analysis compared outcomes for children of same-sex parents to those for 
heterosexual parents (Crowl, Ahn, & Baker, p. 385). Across the 19 studies reviewed, children 
cared for by same-sex parents "fare[ d] equally well" to those raised by heterosexual couples in 
terms of developmental outcomes and quality of parent-child relationships (Crowl et al. , 2007, p. 
394). These results are not singular to this study (e.g. Adams & Light, 2014; Patterson, 1992); 
however, research on same-sex couples remains fairly limited (Crowl et al., 2007, p. 399). 
More research has been conducted on single parent family structures. One study of 3,509 
single mothers and single fathers found that on 22 out of 32 outcomes (e.g., parenting attitudes, 
parenting style, and parental involvement in school) no significant differences between males 
and females presented (Dufur et al. , 2010, p. 1101). Out of those which were significant, several 
of the variables were "very close to non-significance" (Dufur et al. , 2010, p. 1101). The 
researchers note that the large sample size might have made some variables more likely to be 
statistically significant despite not being particularly meaningful (Dufur et al., 2010, p. 1101 ). 
For example, the difference for "negative feelings about parenting" was statistically significant, 
but the difference found was less than a .01 (m = 0.079, f = 0.073) (Dufur et al. , 2010, p. 1100). 
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Through a review of 81 studies published from 1990-2010, Timothy Biblarz and Judith 
Stacey were able to summarize the results of relatively recent studies regarding the importance of 
parent gender (20 10, p. 6). From reviewing these bodies of work, Biblarz and Stacey concluded 
that "family structure modifies [gender] differences in parenting" (20 10, p. 1 7). Studies signaled 
that single parents were more likely to adopt parenting styles typically associated with the 
opposite gender role. For example, single fathers "displayed some 'maternal' capacities" 
(Biblarz & Stacey, 2010, p. 16). Not present in married heterosexual fathers, it was hypothesized 
that they adapted their parenting style when a woman was not present to fill such a role (Biblarz 
& Stacey, 2010, p. 16). On average, single fathers "scored higher on parenting scales, did more 
housework, and enjoyed warmer, more verbal relations with their children than married fathers" 
(Biblarz & Stacey, 2010, p. 16). Conversely, married heterosexual fathers often scored the lowest 
in the domains listed above (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010, p. 16). They did, however, "improve 
notably when faced with single or primary parenthood" (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010, p. 17). Just as 
single fathers seem to adapt elements of "mothering," the inverse may also hold true. According 
to their literature review, "[s]ingle-sex parenting seems to foster more androgynous parenting 
practices in women and men alike" (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010, p. 17). Women are more apt to 
adopt "conventional paternal practices" when faced with single parenthood (Biblarz & Stacey, 
2010, p. 17). 
Research on same-sex couples and single parents offers a compelling case for gender 
differences being dynamic. Since they are virtually non~existent in single parents, it does not 
make sense to assume gender differences in a parent post-divorce. Beyond that, more recent 
research of married heterosexual couples has also reinforced the negligibility of gender 
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differences in parenting. One such study observed the interaction of 23 7 mothers, fathers, and 
their 2-year old children (Ryan, Martin, & Brooks-Gunn, 2006, p. 211). The results revealed that 
"mothers and fathers exhibited similar parenting patterns" (Ryan et al., 2006, p. 211). The most 
important variable to positive child cognitive outcomes was having at least one "supportive" 
parent- regardless of that parent's gender (Ryan et al., 2006, p. 211). Being supportive is 
characterized by "warmth, stimulation, involvement, and responsiveness" (Ryan et al., 2006, p. 
212). 
The research discussed earlier by Biblarz & Stacey (2010) extended beyond a review of 
single-parents. Based off of their review, "no evidence of gender-based parenting abilities"-
'expectation of lactation' excluded-was found (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010, p. 4). Furthermore, 
they asserted "very little about the gender of the parent has significance for children's 
psychological adjustment and social success" (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010, p. 3). 
Even if small gender differences do exist in some contexts, it does not mean that one 
gender is inherently better equipped to parent. Though it is still true that "mothers tend to be 
more involved than fathers" (Hawkins, Amato, & King, 2006, p. 133), it remains important to 
remember quantifying the time fathers spend with their children "may not be a good indicator of 
their emotional involvement with [them]" (Finken & Amato, 1993, p. 580). Mothers and fathers 
can invest in their children in different ways. When a parent works, they might spend less time 
with their child, but they are still providing support economically. 
Research on gender differences in parents indicate that gender differences, when present, 
are generally small. Like other gender differences, "parenting differences between families often 
exceed gender differences within families" (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010, p. 4). Because gender 
differences in parenting vary, it can be concluded that these differences are not inherent, but 
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rather contextually constructed-often by family structure. It has been established that gender 
differences in children as well as their parents are not significant enough to consider in isolation. 
However, the dynamic of specific parent-child sex compositions as distinct relationships has yet 
to be addressed. Is there merit in considering them in conjunction as is often done in legal 
application of the best interest of the child standard? 
Many claims have been made and theoretical support has been offered for the belief that 
parent-child sex composition matters (Russell & Saebel, 1997, p. 139). However, these claims 
find minimal reinforcement in empirical research. One study examining the distinct nature of 
four dyads (mother-daughter, mother-son, father-daughter, and father-son) resulted in evidence 
that "did not substantiate the proposition of four distinct parent-child relationships" (Russell & 
Saebel, 1997, p. 139). Their research, instead, exposed differences that were "small and 
unreliable" (Russell & Saebel, 1997, p. 139). Another study also found very little difference 
between the four dyads and when differences (e.g., nurturance and warmth, parenting roles and 
behaviors, and parental monitoring) were found, the effects were "very small" (Harris, 2006, p. 
72). The fact that these reports were based off of self-report is noteworthy as larger gender 
differences are typically measured in such circumstances. 
Again, context matters for the uniqueness of parent-child sex composition. The 
importance of "children resid[ing] with same-gender or opposite- gender parents" is negligible 
(Amato, 2000, p. 1281). If gender differences between children, their parents, and their unique 
relationships is inconsequential, why then do courts act as though they do? Are the courts even 
aware that they are acknowledging such distinctions? 
IV. Judges, Litigators and their Biases 
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Gender, one of the most "biologically primitive and important social categories", is the 
"first social category that humans are able to discriminate" (Lenton, Bruder, & Sedikides, 2009, 
p. 183). As early as age two, children develop their first stereotypes-many of which are gender-
related (Lenton eta!., 2009, p. 183). Gender stereotypes, unlike other stereotypes, are commonly 
accepted as "natural, inevitable, and fair" due to their complementary nature-what one lacks, 
the other has in abundance (i.e. Men are perceived to be logical and women are not, but women 
are perceived as nurturing and men are not) (Jost & Kay, 2005, p. 499). 
Based off of these stereotypes, individuals develop biases. Biases are essentially 
prejudices which lead one to favor one entity over another. In the past, biases based off of gender 
stereotypes manifested more explicitly; today, however, "discrimination has largely shifted from 
overt and intentional to convert and unintentional" (Hyman, 2014, p. 41). As such, research 
regarding implicit biases, or "biases that unconsciously shape our cognition and subsequent 
action," has grown in recent years (Simmons, 2016, p. 35). 
Social sciences have arrived to a consensus that every individual possesses bias 
(Scopelliti, et al., 20 15; p. 2468). The inherent issue is not the bias itself, but rather a lack of 
recognition (Scopelliti et al., 2015, p. 2468). In other words, bias is not necessarily the problem, 
but rather the fact that it is often subconscious or implicit. In general, "people exhibit a tendency 
to believe they are less biased than their peers" (Scopelleti et al., 2015, p. 2468). Research 
conducted by faculty from Carnegie Mellon University and the University of London found that 
just as everyone has bias, they also suffer from a "bias blind spot" (Scopelleti et al., 2015, p. 
2469). In fact, of the 661 individuals tested, only one admitted to being more biased than the 
average person despite evidence to the contrary (Scopelleti et al., 2015, p. 2479). As one would 
imagine, this occurrence is not uncommon. Individuals "frequently" self-report lower levels of 
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bias than "their actual measured bias" (Hyman, 2014, p. 42). Individuals are not likely being 
intentionally dishonest, they simply are "unable to know the contents of their mind" (Kang & 
Banaji, 2006, p. 1071 ). 
Research on implicit biases infonns several of these "subconscious associations are so 
strong ... even the brightest among us are prone to unwittingly rely upon them"- at times 
compromising the truth (Simmons, 2016, p. 35). Even when one brings the best intentions, 
implicit bias "subconsciously shapes" the way we regard others and what we do with that 
inf01mation (Simmons, 2016, p. 36). As such, though one might not resolve to discriminate, 
decisions are often rationalized via implicit bias which can accOLmt for "unconscious adjustments 
in our assessment criteria" (Simmons, 2016, p. 36). 
Of course, there are no laws forbidding the average person from simply harboring these 
biases. Those in the legal field, however, are held to an elevated standard (Ream & Hearing, 
2015, p. 2). Citing the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court 
has ruled that "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). They further defined fairness as "an absence of actual bias 
in the trial of cases" !d. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3 (C) (1) (a), 
which applies to federal judges, upholds that a judge must disqualify or recuse themself under 
the following circumstances: 
"A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances in 
which: (a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding" 
The exact language utilized above also applies to judges presiding in Indiana as laid out in the 
Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11 (a) (1). 
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The law clearly states that a judge should recuse themself from a case when they bear a 
"personal bias," but how would someone know to recuse themself if they remain unaware of the 
bias? Though the courts have long been assumed to be impartial arbiters of justice, they, too, are 
human and thus have biases-even if they don't acknowledge them. Scholars who dedicate 
themselves to understand why inequality is prevalent in various legal contexts have concluded 
implicit bias is a "lead contributing factor" (Hyman, 2014, p. 41 ). Implicit bias permeates the 
court system primarily in one of two ways. First, it can produce "incidental effects on the way 
people perceive, interact with, and. understand others" (Hyman, 2014, p. 42). Second, implicit 
bias can manifest in "tangible forms of discrimination which can alter the course of decision-
making" (Hyman, 2014, p. 42). When left unchecked, these biases can permeate every step of the 
judicial process. 
From the very first meeting with their attorney, the client's "credibility, their jury appeal, 
and the viability of their legal claims" will presumably be met assessed with the counsel's 
implicit biases (Simmons, 2016, p. 36). While judges are responsible for deciding a case, an 
attorney clearly has a huge stake in their client's end result. In her article "Litigator's Beware: 
Implicit Bias," Sarah Q. Simmons, J.D., suggested that attorneys "question whether [their] 
assessment of clients" reflects the client's actual claims or the attorney's subconscious bias 
(2016, p. 36). For example, some assert that attorneys are less likely to encourage a father to seek 
full custody than they are a mother (Rosin, 2014). 
Studies on how judges decide their cases revealed that they "rely extensively on intuition, 
more than deliberative judging" (Bennett, 2010, p. 157). This process of decision making lacks 
all of the safeguards against "underlying prejudice" provided by more deliberative methods 
(Hyman, 2014, p. 44). The decision-making employed by the justices studied mirrored trends of 
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how individuals in general make decisions. Based off of their initial perceptions, they utilized 
certain schemas to guide their decision (Hyman, 2014, p. 41). These schemas are "largely 
automatic," storing our implicit biases, stereotypes, and attitudes (Hyman, 2014, p. 41). Though 
schemas often serve individuals well by providing them relatively accurate perceptions in an 
efficient manner, the associations our brain has created do not always reflect the reality of a 
given situation (Hyman, 2014, p. 41). 
A similar phenomenon was at hand in various cases explored in Pmt One. For example, 
in In re Marriage of Tresnak, the trial court judge assumed that the father would be best 
equipped to parent the sons because he would "be able to engage in various activities with the 
boys, such as athletic events, fishing, hunting, mechanical training and other activities that boys 
are interested in." 297 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Iowa 1980). However, there was no evidence presented 
by the father's council that would corroborate this claim, nor is there any evidence that engaging 
in such activities does a good parent make. In this case, the judge ruled based off of evident 
gender stereotypes which biased him. 
With the creation of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), researchers have been able to 
more thoroughly test for implicit biases. These tests "measure individuals' reaction times to 
associations between various concepts (e.g., Black or White) and attributes (e.g., good or bad)" 
(Hyman, 2014, p. 41). Regarding gender, these tests have revealed that women are more often 
associated with home and men with career. These results could have implications for who judges 
intuitively consider to be a better parent. Indiana cowts obviously incorporate biases, even if 
unintentionally, in their rulings. As established prior, gender/sex biases are some of the most 
primal and deeply embedded. Could these justices be placed at a higher incidence for bias than 
the average person? 
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Some studies on implicit bias focus on priming, the "incidental activation of knowledge 
structures, such as trait concepts and stereotypes, by the current situational context" (Bargh, 
Chen & Burrows, 1996, p. 230). A 2010 study conducted at Rutgers University examined the 
effect of priming gender roles on implicit biases. Their results indicated that those primed with 
"traditional gender roles showed increased automatic gender stereotypes relative to controls" 
(Rudman & Phelan, 2010, p. 192). Another study testing the effect of gender priming on 
women' s success in math showed that women will perform as they are taught to believe they 
will . For example, women primed with the belief that women are bad at math categorically did 
much worse on the test provided than did women who were told that there are no disparities 
between men and women's math abilities (Steele & Ambady, 2006, p. 434). 
It is both good and bad news that implicit biases are dynamic and malleable. Fmtunately, 
the effect of a judge's implicit gender/sex biases can be mitigated through priming. 
Unfortunately, they can also be emphasized with priming. Indiana Code § 31-14-13-2 implies 
that the sex of the child is categorically significant to that child's experience post-divorce. Even 
though that implication is not grounded in empirical evidence, judges are likely to assume strict 
male/ female dichotomies exist and that they have substantial effects on the child's disposition 
and needs. By listing sex explicitly as a factor, Indiana Code implies that males and females are 
fundamentally different. These implication could prime judges to decide accordingly. 
47 
Part Three: 
Proposing a Change 
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I. Overview of the Policy 
As applied to family law, the Best Interest of the Child Doctrine guides judges in 
deciding child custody cases via a highly subjective, discretionary test which weighs all factors 
deemed relevant to the wellbeing of a given child. This now hegemonic standard was formulated 
as a gender-neutral reaction to its predecessor, The Tender Years' Doctrine. Predicated on the 
belief that mothers were inherently better caregivers than fathers, under the Tender Years 
Doctrine courts would commonly rule that a child should be placed in the custody of the 
mother~specially if the child was of "tender years", or less than four years old. Because this 
standard put undue burden on mothers and disadvantaged fathers, the Best Interest of the Child 
Standard (BICS) sought to provide a standard gender-neutral in nature, so that neither parent 
would be favored simply because of their sex/ gender. 
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) of 1970 set the stage for a state-by-
state nationwide acceptance of the BICS. Because family law falls within the discretion of state 
government rather than the federal government, each state was allowed to incorporate (or not 
incorporate) the standard in their own way. Indiana is one of 22 states to define the BICS 
statutorily in two parts-first, in more general terms with "overarching goals, purposes, and 
objectives" (Child Welfare Information gateway, 2016, p. 2) and, second, in specific statutory 
criteria. Indiana Code§ 31-14-13-2 predominantly draws upon those factors laid out previously 
in the UMDA. Below is the statute which delineates some of those factors deemed "relevant" 
when determining what is best for a child (phrases in bold overlap with the UMDA): 
( 1) The age and sex of the child. 
(2)' The wishes of the child's parents. _ 
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the 
child is at least fourteen (14) years of age. 
( 4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with: 
(A) the child's parents; 
(B) the child's siblings; and 
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest. 
(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community. 
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent. 
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(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence 
is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this 
chapter. 
Subsection Seven (7) and Eight (8) were both added to the statute in the 90s (1996 and 1999 
respectively), meaning that barring criterion one, all other factors outlined in the original statute 
were drawn directly from the factors posed in the UMDA. Criteria 2-6 constitute the entirety of 
the factors listed in the UMDA. Why was Indiana compelled to add IC § 31-14-13-2 (1)? Does 
empirical research on sex difference (or gender difference) merit this consideration? 
II. Critique of Policy 
Against the standard itself, many criticisms have been leveled. Assessed as too subjective 
and incommensurable, critics hold that it provides the judge an excess of personal discretion. 
When specifically assessing the merit of weighing a child's sex as a factor directly related to 
their best interests, further critiques surface. As the evidence posed on Part Two suggested, 
research has found that boys and girls are "basically the same" (Hyde, 2005, p. 586) despite the 
consensus among a majority of Americans that they are "basically different" (Parker et al., 
20 17). Studies have concluded that there are negligible differences between boys and girls 
themselves (Hyde, 2005; Costa Jr., et al., 2001; Else-Quest et al., 2006; Zell et al., 2015; Siegling 
et al., 2015; Maccoby, 1990), their needs, and, more specifically, their needs post-divorce (e.g., 
Sigal et al., 2011; Amato & Gilbreth, 1999; Amato & Keith, 1991; Amato, 2000; Bastaitis & 
Mortelmans, 2016; Kelly & Emery, 2003). 
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When the sex of the child is weighed, it is weighed in concert with that of the parent. Re 
The Marriage of Tresnak, 297 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Iowa 1980). Just as studies have found 
negligible differences between boys and girls, research (e.g., Biblarz & Stacey, 2010; Dufur et 
al., 2010; Crowl et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2006) also indicates that neither parent provides better 
care due to their gender or sex. Finally, difference in the sex composition of parent-child dyads 
(i.e. mother- daughter, mother-son, father-daughter, father-son) has not proved substantive 
(Russel & Saebel, 1997, p. 139). By explicitly listing sex as a factor, Indiana Code implies that 
males and females are fundamentally different. This implication could "prime" (incidentally 
activate knowledge structures, such as traits or stereotypes) judges to decide according to their 
implicit biases related to gender/ sex. 
Not only is the addition of sex as a consideration not empirically grounded, it also 
problematic in a legal sense. IC § 31-14-13-2 ( 1) likely provides Indiana judges a "backdoor" to 
the Tender Years Doctrine (Atkinson, 1983, p. 13), which is a standard proven not to be in the 
child's best interest. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 291. Considering the sex of the child contradicts the 
gender neutral intent of the standard facially and implicitly. By doing so, the judiciary fosters an 
environment prone to bias and subjectivity regardless of impartial intent. 
The consideration of the sex of the child has been statutorily forbidden by several states 
(i.e. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Nebraska, Texas, Vermont) and ruled unconstitutional by 
others (e.g., Alabama, Iowa, New York). State courts have ruled that such considerations follow 
precedent laid in Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) and often violate their state's equal protection 
clauses. The state of Alabama even held that the consideration of sex violates the Equal 
Protection Clause found in the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment JE.B. v. Alabama ex 
ref. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130- 31, (1994). Finally, the Indiana Court of Appeals has previously 
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held that the consideration of child's sex when determining child custody is "suspect" Matter of 
Adoption of Thomas 431 N.E.2d at 513. 
III. Recommendations 
By synthesizing empirical research on gender/sex differences with legal research on 
context surrounding the Best Interest of the Child Doctrine, this paper finds in favor of the ruling 
in State ex rei. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973), there is no 
"compelling state interest" for discriminating on the basis of sex in child custody cases. The 
gender/sex differences between males and females are not substantive enough to merit drawing 
such a distinction. Moreover, the research available indicates that such discrimination is 
presumably unconstitutional. As such, the Indiana General Assembly should not only 
eliminate § 31-14-13-2(1 ), they should also prohibit its consideration statutorily. Precedent for 
this legislative change can be found in the respective statutes of Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Nebraska, Texas, Vermont. 
Below is the recommended legislative modification for the Indiana General Assembly 
regarding IC § 31-14-13-2. Per the Indiana General Assembly's Printing Code, the text of the 
existing provision will appear in this style type, additions will appear in this style type, and 
deletions will appear in this style type. 
Sec. 2. The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child. 
In determining the child's best interests, there is not a presumption favoripg either parent. 
The Court shall not apply a preference for one parent over the other because of the 
sex of the child or the sex of a parent. The court shall consider all relevant factors, 
including the following: 
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(1) The age and ss< of the ehild. 
f21 (t) The wishes of the child's parents. 
(3j (2) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is 
at least fourteen (14) years of age. 
(41 (3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with: 
(A) the child's parents; 
(B) the child's siblings; and 
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest. 
(5j (4) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community. 
(6j (5) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 
(91 (6) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent. 
(8:} (7) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is 
sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this chapter. 
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